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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the factors that led to the insubordination of enlisted personnel of the 
Malawi Defense Force (MDF), which happened during the transition to democracy in 
December 1993. The regular enlisted members of the MDF engaged in an armed conflict 
with the armed wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP)—Malawi Young 
Pioneers (MYP). The MYP was then completely disarmed and disbanded in an operation 
called “Operation Bwezani,” which was started by the enlisted personnel without proper 
orders from the officers’ corps or the general commanding the MDF. 
The author argues that competition of military resources, corruption among 
generals, officers’ promotion goals, poorly defined roles of the MYP, and little incentive 
among senior military leadership to confront the president to push for free and fair 
democratic elections were the main factors that led to the rebellion of the enlisted 
personnel. The moment in which military personnel turned on Malawi’s authoritarian 
government by disbanding the MYP, helps us to predict future cases in which the armed 
forces may withdraw their support from a nondemocratic regime, thereby triggering 
instability and potentially space for the installation of democracy. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research will strive to answer the following question: What caused enlisted 
personnel in the Malawi national military (Malawi Defense Force, MDF) to rebel during 
the country’s 1992–94 democratization process? In answering this question, the research 
will also answer why in 1993 enlisted military personnel engaged themselves in the 
armed conflict against the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), the armed wing of the 
outgoing ruling  Malawi Congress Party (MCP). 
From independence from British colonial rule in 1963 until 1994, Malawi was 
ruled by the authoritarian government of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda under single-party 
rule. British Commander Brigadier Timothy Louis handed the Malawi Army—then 
called Kings African Rifles (KAR) over to Banda—to help the latter maintain national 
security and sovereignty. Independent of the army (the sole military branch), in 1963 
Banda established an armed wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) called the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP),1 which his government used to oppress political 
opponents. In December 1993 and amid transition to democracy, the Malawi Army 
disarmed and disbanded the MYP, an operation led not by military leadership but rather 
by enlisted personnel, and subsequently the Malawi Army Commander took control of 
the operation and led the final steps in dissolving the MYP.2 The disbandment of the 
MYP made possible true competition among political parties and thus instrumental in the 
democratization process. What explains this case of insubordination so critical for 
democracy in Malawi? 
                                                 
1 Kings M. Phiri, “A Case Of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and 
the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers,” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies, Vol. 1, No. 
1 (March 2000). From Phiri’s article, the MYP were established as the elite wing of the League of Malawi 
Youth, a division of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in 1963, the year Malawi attained internal self-
government with Dr. Banda as Prime Minister. 
2 Reuben Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony 
in Malawi,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(2): 146–163 (2004). 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
By focusing on the moment in which military personnel turned on Malawi’s 
authoritarian government by disbanding the MYP, this thesis may help us to predict 
future cases in which the armed forces may withdraw their support from a nondemocratic 
regime, thereby triggering instability and potentially space for the installation of 
democracy.  
Even more fundamentally, this research seeks to identify the factors that led 
rebellious enlisted personnel in the Malawi national army to initiate an armed operation 
independent of military leadership. Explaining this high level of military factionalism 
holds relevance for question of military effectiveness and civilian control. Civilians in 
government cannot rely on armed forces as an instrument of national power if there is 
substantial disobedience within the military itself by personnel who ignore the military 
ethic of obedience.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Problem  
Insubordination of the enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force by 
attacking the armed wing (Malawi Young Pioneers) of the ruling single party regime 
(Malawi Congress Party) without orders from the government or from army leaders 
during regime transition. 
2. Hypothesis 
I hypothesize that the following five factors may have combined to cause only 
enlisted personnel to start the disarmament operation against the MYP: 
 Competition for military resources between the MDF and the MYP; 
 Corruption among generals; 
 Officers’ promotion goals; 
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 Poorly defined roles of the MYP, which was seen as encroaching on 
military duties especially when the MYP worked as the presidential guard; 
and 
 Little incentive among senior military leadership to confront the president 
(due to the great power wielded by the executive under “presidentialism” 
in Africa)3 to push for free and fair democratic elections. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
For this research, process tracing was conducted to analyze civil-military 
relations—including varied relations between Banda and the officer corps, on the one 
hand, and enlisted personnel, on the other—and military cohesion from 1964 through 
1993, in order to identify the factors that caused the rebellion.  The research relied mainly 
on secondary data sources obtained from books, journals, scholarly articles, and other 
written materials. The study also draws on the author’s own experience working in the 
Defense Force. 
E. CASE DESCRIPTION 
In March 1992, Catholic Bishops issued an episcopal letter to Banda criticizing 
him of corruption, poverty and lack of democratic governance.4 The presentation of the 
pastoral letter by the Catholic Church in 1992 was immediately followed by 
demonstrations and strikes by urban workers and university students.5 This resulted in 
country-wide popular protests against the single-party regime, and the military supported 
the regime change by not interfering with the protests and demonstrations. Apart from 
human rights, the domestic pressure also demanded Banda to disarm his MYP. Banda 
could not give in to such demands because doing so would mean stripping away his 
                                                 
3 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions 
in Comparative Perspective (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 63. 
4 Jankees Vand Onge, “Kamuzu’s Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi or Searching for the Rules 
of the Game in African Politics,” African Affairs Vol. 94 No. 375 (1995):  229–30. 
5 Chirwa et al., Democracy Report for Malawi, 2-3.  See also Nandini Patel, “Political Parties: 
Development and Change in Malawi,” Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Research Report 21 
(Johannesburg: EISA, 2006), 15-16. http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/rr21.pdf, Accessed September 16, 2011. 
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oppressive powers. As an example, at an emergency MCP executive meeting held soon 
after the reading of the pastoral letter in all Catholic Churches throughout the country, 
one of Banda’s closest allies who was also in charge of MYP operations, John Z. Tembo, 
suggested and resolved to kill the bishops who authored the letter.6 The information 
leaked to the media. This alerted the international donor community which, in a way, 
saved the bishops’ lives by pressurizing Banda for regime change and threatening to 
freeze aid.7 The news that the MCP had resolved to kill the Catholic bishops became part 
of campaign material and spread across the whole country like bushfire. The protests, 
therefore, gained mass support country-wide. 
Meanwhile, since the MYP did not support the general populace for regime 
change due to its loyalty to Banda, the MYP became arrogant and cases of violence were 
reported. In particular, it deliberately attacked isolated military members in drinking 
places. As an example, on 1 December 1993, members of the MYP shot and killed two 
enlisted members of the MDF over disagreements at a local bar in Mzuzu—a major city 
in the northern region of the country.8 The incident marked the immediate cause of the 
rebellion of the enlisted personnel in Malawi. The matter was immediately reported to 
Moyale Barracks, which is located within Mzuzu City. Accordingly, the defense force 
headquarters in the capital city of Lilongwe was informed, and soldiers an all barracks 
throughout the country keenly waited for immediate response from the generals. 
The killing of the two soldiers by the MYP was taken lightly by the generals, 
while the enlisted personnel treated the matter as significant that demanded reiteration. 
The two soldiers were killed on a weekend. During the same time, the general 
commanding the MDF was attending marriage ceremonies of his daughter at Zomba—
the old capital city situated in the southern region of the country. After being briefed 
about the deceased soldiers, the commander reiterated that he would see what to do when 
he reported to office on Monday. It may be deduced that either he was afraid to confront 
                                                 
6 Patel, “Political Parties: Development and Change in Malawi,” 16. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in 
Malawi,” 155.  
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Banda on the issue or he was just overwhelmed by the wedding. Soldiers in all barracks 
kept vigil and remained on stand-by with full-scale marching order (FSMO) awaiting 
further orders from the senior military leadership. Having waited for forty-eight hours 
without any order, the anger in the enlisted personnel raged, and they doubted if the 
generals were doing something about the prevailing situation. The junior soldiers 
concluded that the generals were corrupt and conniving with Banda in equipping the 
MYP with military gadgets.  Additionally, it was deemed that the generals did not want 
to support the democratization process by eliminating the MYP due to incentives they 
gained through Banda’s government. It is, therefore, rumored that the commander of the 
military, Major General Yohane, was put under house arrest just before the 
commencement of the operation for failing to authorize and order the disarmament of the 
MYP.9 
Without orders or leadership from the officers’ corps, the enlisted personnel took 
up arms and ammunition and started the fight against the MYP bases in Mzuzu and the 
northern region as a whole. Meanwhile, in Lilongwe, where the military headquarters 
were situated, soldiers were so angry that the commander was put under house arrest and 
was not allowed to move. The soldiers had completely lost trust in him and were no 
longer willing to take instructions from him. On the second day of attack, junior officers 
joined the enlisted personnel with a coordinated plan of maneuver, and informal orders 
were issued. All the MYP bases and camps throughout the country were captured and, 
within a week10 of sustained fire, the MYP bases were demolished, weapons and 
equipment captured. All enlisted members of the MDF—regular soldiers on monthly 
government remuneration, participated in the operation.11 
Most of the captured equipment was marked “Malawi Defense Force,” implying 
that the equipment was purchased and acquired in the name of the Malawi military, yet it 
                                                 
9 Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in 
Malawi,” 155. 
10 Ibid., 152. 
11 The MYP were the only militia forces and to avoid their emergence, section 159 of 2005 
Constitution of Malawi stipulates that there shall be no military force constituted in Malawi other than the 
Defense Force.  
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went to the armed wing of Banda’s single party regime—hence the name “Operation 
Bwezani,” which literally means “return to rightful owner,” in this case the military.12 
This revelation fueled more aggressive action against the MYP. The suspicion of foul 
play by the generals was also increased. 
The result of the operation was that approximately 2000 MYP members are 
believed to have fled into Mozambique with their firearms,13 while twenty-five members 
of the MYP and four regular military soldiers lost their lives. The MYP also suffered 123 
casualties.14 The rest of the members of the MYP surrendered and were allowed to 
peacefully integrate with the general population as civilians without discrimination. 
Although Banda was sick, he was still in charge of the country and quickly changed the 
command of the MDF following Operation Bwezani. On December 9 1993, Banda 
retired Major General Yohane and appointed General Dimas Maulana as the new 
commander of the MDF.15 The rebellion of the enlisted personnel helped the military to 
eliminate the armed wing of the single party regime, and the country was then organized 
with only one armed force to uphold the sovereign integrity of Malawi as provided by the 
constitution. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I provides the background information to the causes of rebellion of 
enlisted personnel. Chapter II outlines different theories that will be tested in order to 
determine the causes of the insubordination of enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense 
Force during the transition to democracy. Chapter III will give a brief history of Malawi, 
highlight the establishment and the roles of both the Malawi Defense Force and the 
Malawi Young Pioneers with particular attention on the distribution of resources, both 
                                                 
12 Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in 
Malawi,” 153. 
13 Undule Mwakasungula and David Nungu, “Country Study: Malawi,” in Hide and Seek: Taking 
Account of Small Arms in Southern Africa by Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (October 2004), 80, 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Hide+Seek/Contents.htm. 
14 Phiri, “A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the 
Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers,” 9. 
15 Chirambo, “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in 
Malawi,” 158. 
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equipment and personnel, from 1964–93. The chapter will also discuss how civilian 
leadership corrupted the senior military leadership to have complete civilian control. The 
chapter will also discuss the act that surmounted insubordination by the enlisted 
personnel and the disarmament of the Malawi Young Pioneers. The last chapter will 
summarize the main findings and make a generalized statement. The chapter will analyze 
the new roles of the MDF that resulted during democratization process (1994–2004) and 
Malawi’s contribution towards counterterrorism. A prescription will be made to prevent 
recurrence of such rebellion. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Several analysts have sought to explain why military personnel act 
insubordinately by rebelling against their superior officers and political leaders in the 
developing world. In order to explain the Malawi case, we can look at civil-military 
relations during the “third wave” of democratization,16 which started in Portugal in 1974 
and reached Africa in 1980s17 and particularly Malawi in the early 1990s.  The wave was 
characterized by military coups. In Nigeria, at the beginning of 1984 the military 
removed the democratically elected government (in place since 1979), returning the 
country to military rule.18 In South Africa, negotiations between President Fredrick W. de 
Klerk and the African National Congress intensified in 1990 to bring apartheid to an end 
after a long period of insurgency and military action.19 In contrast, though the case of 
Malawi demonstrates an important political role for the armed forces, the country has not 
experienced any attempts by the military to overthrow the government. 
Though important insights can be drawn from the literature, at first glance it 
seems that existing scholarship may not explain the factors leading to the causes of 
insubordination by enlisted personnel in Malawi in 1993. This is a unique case because 
literature tells us that in most cases rebellions are led by middle- or high-ranking officers 
and not the enlisted personnel as was the case with Malawi. Thus the available literature 
does not fully explain the outcome in Malawi. 
Finer, a renowned political scientist and historian argues that the military has the 
prerogative to rise against authoritarian regime and facilitate in the democratization 
process, and the level of military intervention depends on the level of the political culture 
of a particular society or country.20 Political culture can be defined and summarized as 
                                                 
16 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3-25. 
17 Ibid., 3-25. 
18 Ibid., 24. 
19 Ibid., 25. 
20 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics (New Jersey: Pall Mall 
Press, 2002), 23, 87. 
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the pattern of attitudes, beliefs and orientations of individuals towards politics in a 
particular political system.21 In his analysis, Finer outlines four levels of political culture 
depending on the satisfaction of the following three conditions: 
• Does there exist a wide public approval of the procedures for transfer of 
civil power, and a corresponding belief that no exercise of power in breach 
of these procedures is legitimate? 
• Does there exist a wide public recognition as to who or what constitutes 
the sovereign authority, and a corresponding belief that no other persons 
or center of power is legitimate or duty-worthy? 
• Is the public proportionately large and well-mobilized into private 
associations i.e., do we find cohesive churches, industrial associations and 
firms, labor unions, and political parties?22 
The highest order is the mature political culture, which can be realized only when 
all three of the conditions are fulfilled. Intervention of the military in countries with 
mature political cultures would be regarded as interference with political systems and 
completely unjustifiable. Public sanction for such action would not be granted. The next 
higher order is the developed political culture where civil society and institutions are 
highly developed and the public is proportionally varied with sound organizations of 
powerful groupings and associations. In the developed political culture, civil procedures 
and public authorities are deep-rooted. In contrast to the mature political culture, the 
legitimacy of the processes involved in transferring political power and the consideration 
as to what should constitute the sovereign authority are in disagreement. The military 
intervention in this group of countries meets strong public resistance. Low political 
culture is the third category of political culture and is characterized by a relatively narrow 
and weakly organized public. Like the developed political culture, the institutions and 
procedures of the regime are also in disagreement. However, the opinion from the public 
would not very strongly resist military intervention. The last group is the minimal 
                                                 
21 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1989), 32. 
22 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics, 87-88. 
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political culture where the government can ignore public opinion, and the politically 
articulate public, which is very small and weakly organized into associations. In this 
group, legitimization of military intervention is not important.
23
 Figure 1 gives the 
summary of the relationship between the level of political culture and the anticipated 
level of military intervention. 
 
Figure 1.   Political Culture and Military Intervention 
Source: Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in 
Politics (New Jersey: Pall Mall Press, 2002), 139. 
From the above analysis, Malawi belongs to the fourth order of minimal political 
culture because during democratization, the country had weak institutional arrangements 
and the many people were still affected by stigma due to the presence of Banda’s 
widespread repressive machinery—the MYP. From Figure 1, the MDF had two options 
of military intervention. The military could either displace or supplant Banda’s regimes 
while reorganizing the country for democratic elections. 
                                                 
23 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in Politics, 86-89. 
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In Latin America, the Argentine and Venezuelan cases of military rebellion are 
particularly informative in that they are cases of rebellion by mid-ranking officers. In her 
analysis of the two cases, Deborah Norden argues that domestic use and politicization of 
military officers fuels rebellion.24 In Argentina, mid-ranking officers led rebellions at 
different points in time between 1987 and 1990 due to dissatisfaction with policies of the 
newly established democratic government as well as with military leadership.25  In 
Venezuela, too, mid-ranking officers rebelled, only there rebellion took the form of coup 
attempts in 1992 that, had they been successful, would have interrupted the country’s 
consolidated democratic regime in place since 1958.26  Norden contends that the 
rebellions by the lieutenant colonels in both countries were due to the use of the military 
against the country’s own citizens, coupled with economic problems that had a direct 
impact on military personnel and resentment among the lower ranks toward senior 
military officers for being highly politicized.27 These tensions were exacerbated by 
decreasing governability within each country due to the deteriorating economy. 
On the other hand, in his analysis of the 1992 coup attempts in Venezuela, 
Trinkunas argues that an institutional outlook focused on civil-military relations is 
required to appreciate why coups happen.28 He contends that “in Venezuela after the 
1958 transition to democracy, civilians consolidated control of the armed forces in 
accordance with institutions that disunited the officer corps but satisfied their personal 
and professional interests.”29 Lack of consensus on the mission of the armed forces and 
competition for supremacy between the army, the navy and the air force deepened inter- 
 
 
                                                 
24 Deborah L. Norden, “The Rise of the Lieutenant Colonels: Rebellion in Argentina and Venezuela,” 




28 Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the 
Fifth Republic,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2002): 43 
29 Ibid., 44. 
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service rivalries.30 Struggles to curry favor with politicians aggravated the rivalries and 
contributed to resentment among junior officers towards the highly politicized, corrupt 
senior officer corps.  
When politicians refrained from active oversight of the armed forces, they failed 
to notice the increasingly antagonistic factions of the junior officers who resented their 
military superiors and ferociously disapproved of the Venezuelan political system. 
Additionally, the specific economic, defense, and foreign policies of the Perez 
government (1989–93) angered many officers and forced them to join the anti-
government factions in the armed forces.31 Senior also officers lost touch with the rest of 
the officer corps and “in this environment a small group of conspirators could organize a 
coup d’état relatively unchecked.”32  
Norden and especially Trinkunas’ arguments helps to explain the causes of 
insubordination in Malawi since they pose an explanation for why junior officers might 
resent and break with senior officers. As for the case of Malawi, the disunity was 
between enlisted personnel and the officer corps. In my research, I will systematically 
consider the different independent variables that Norden and Trinkunas identify and 
assess the extent to which they help to explain the insubordination in Malawi. 
As evident in Trinkunas’ analysis of the Venezuelan case, a lack of attention to 
defense policies and spending by the civilian politicians may lead to insubordination or 
coup. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas develop these ideas further, for instance 
highlighting how reduced defense spending can trigger military insubordination. Pion-
Berlin and Trinkunas argue that in the post-transition context civilian governments 
intentionally cut defense budgets in order to render the armed forces ineffective or 
toothless for conducting coups.33 However, because the armed forces rely on resources to 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 43. 
31 Trinkunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth 
Republic,” 43. 
32 Ibid., 49. 
33 David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense 
Policy in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review Vol.42, No.3 (October 2007): 76-97. 
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prepare to perform their missions (which vary according to the different national 
context), military personnel were angered by lack of such resources and support. 
Consistent with Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ observation that cutting defense 
budgets can trigger military resentment of politicians and even military intervention in 
politics, Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler, echoing Huntington’s work on “objective 
civilian control,” argue that “maximizing the professionalism of the military will ensure 
civilian control because professional militaries are by definition subordinate.”34  
In the developing world, however, it is critical to keep in mind that further 
professionalizing the armed forces—e.g., in terms of institutionalized rules, training, and 
education for promotion—has not always come with civilian control of the armed forces. 
In his well-known analysis, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military 
Role Expansion,” Alfred Stepan brings to the fore how, in fact, Latin American armed 
forces that staged coups in the 1960s and 1970s and subsequently ran government into 
the 1980s throughout the region had been highly professional.35 Research on Africa has 
also treated professionalism and military politicization as separate processes, though 
scholars have not necessarily credited Stepan for his insights. For example, in a report of 
the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Butts and Metz argue that military 
ties to politics coupled with low military professionalism may encourage insubordination 
and rebellion in Africa. From case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, the authors 
contend that if the vulnerable democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are to be maintained, 
African armed forces must be separated from politics and take concrete steps toward the 
form of military professionalism observed in steady democracies around the world.36  
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Research for this study will analyze changing levels of military politicization and 
professionalism in Malawi across time, without assuming that professionalism 
necessarily reduces politicization. As part of this analysis I will trace Banda’s defense 
policy across time to identify any changes leading up to the 1993 rebellion, focusing 
specifically on government neglect of the defense arena—which would allow military 
organization independent of political scrutiny—and also policies that might have harmed 
the warfighting capacity of the army. My analysis will take into consideration relevant 
contextual factors, including for example, economic crisis, which potentially would also 
detract from military effectiveness by reducing the defense budget. 
Another factor that may encourage military rebellion in transition moments under 
non-democracy is the type of nondemocratic regime in place. In their comparative 
analysis of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton and van de Walle argue that 
the “outcome of a political struggle critically depends on the way power was exercised by 
the rulers of the previous regime even if regime transitions are characterized by 
considerable amount of uncertainty and serendipity.”37 The manner in which power was 
used by the previous regime can trigger or incite a coup or not during the transition 
process toward another regime. Specifically, iron-fisted civilian leaders that exercise 
subjective civilian control while denying professionalism to the military are likely to face 
military rebellion and coups. 
Bratton and van de Walle’s analysis goes far to explain dynamics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In Africa, some who practiced dictatorship came from either the army or famous, 
strong political party. After acquiring leadership position, they amass power by declaring 
total personal control over formal political structures (“presidentialism”).38 Due to the 
amassing power syndrome, “presidentialism contributed to the weakening of already frail 
structures within the military, the judiciary, and the civil service.”39 In the case of the 
armed forces, it is predicted that such weakening could encourage insubordination and 
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even rebellion. Banda’s rule is a strong example of presidentialism.  This research will 
therefore examine Banda’s policies in terms of the degree to which over time they 
weakened military institutional structures. 
In contrast to Bratton and van de Walle’s conclusions based on African cases, in 
their analysis of transitions in southern Europe and Latin America, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter contend that the consequence of transition depends on the important divisions 
within the authoritarian regime itself.40  Although the ordinary citizen took a leading part 
in Malawi’s regime transition,41 most of the important figures were breakaways from the 
ruling MCP, for instance Dr. Bakili Muluzi who formed the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), an opposition political party. Bratton and van de Walle, and O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, may help explain the cause of military insubordination in Malawi during 
regime change since the main opposition political parties were breakaways from the 
outgoing single party. 
Evidence suggests that the above hypotheses focused on how military 
professionalism, institutional strength, corruption, and ongoing politicization relate to 
insubordination and rebellion may be accurate for African cases. Indeed, the 2010 Crisis 
Group Africa Report contends that politicization of the military, corruption and poor 
governance have resulted in widespread revolts, insubordination and military coups in 
Guinea Bissau following the withdrawal of the French colonial masters in 1958.42 “Poor 
conditions of service and abnormal and biased recruitment characterized by President 
Lansana Conté and the junta that took over on his death in December 2008”43 further 
aggravated the deteriorating conditions in the military. The report further contends that 
the leader of the tribunal used the military to deal with his rivals in the political sphere.44 
Ethnic recruitment of the militia also exacerbated tension between the tribunal and the 
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rest of the members of the armed forces. This resulted in the armed forces being divided 
along ethnic and epoch lines characterized by wide range of indiscipline, human rights 
abuse, criminalization, insurrection, insubordination and insurgency. It is envisaged that 
both economic and financial management are rooted in corruption due to weak or non-
availability of civilian and military oversight institutions.  This results in a small number 
of senior officers living a comfortable life while the army increases in size with poorly 
trained personnel.45 Since these acts happened during consolidation phase of 
democracy,46 some insights can also be drawn and applied to come up with the causes of 
insubordination Malawi during the democratization process. Lack of civilian and military 
oversight institutions to check on poor governance and corruption could be one of the 
causes of insubordination relevant to Malawi case. 
Although these different studies offer compelling explanations for military 
rebellion and democratization in Malawi, they do not explain why in Malawi it was the 
enlisted personnel who rebelled.  
During regime change, “the military has an important role in influencing the 
outcome by either staging a coup against the regime or by refusing the use of armed force 
against the people who threatening to overthrow the regime.”47 The military in Malawi 
did neither of these but instead concentrated its effort on the disarmament of the armed 
wing of the Malawi Congress Party through in-service rebellion and later on the 
operation was systematically executed. Through the disarmament of the outgoing armed 
wing of the single party rule, Malawi’s national military was supportive of democratic 
initiatives as contended by Bratton and van de Walle.48 
Also in Africa, the institutional heritage of neopatrimonial rule has a direct 
bearing on the outcome of regime transitions.49 The urge for regime change is more 
                                                 
45 Guinea: “Reforming the Army,” 6-32. 
46 Ibid. 
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driven by mass political uprising rather than the official elites. Again the state, as was the 
case of Banda’s government in Malawi, deprived the populace from wealth 
accumulation, thereby forcing the middle class; in which majority of the enlisted 
personnel belong, to be in the fore front of the protests against the single party rule.50 
A lot has been written on civil-military relations but very little has been done on 
the “soldier-officer”51 relations, which are an important dimension of cohesion and 
subordination of the armed forces.  Poor civil-military and soldier-officer corps relations 
can lead to dissatisfaction of either enlisted personnel or officer corps and can be a 
precondition for insubordination or rebellion.  
This research will seek to deepen our understanding of why enlisted personnel 
rebel in developing countries against the government. It is hypothesized that competition 
for military resources between the national armed forces and other armed state actors, 
poorly defined roles of those other state security forces, and the politicization of the 
senior officer corps may lead to insubordination and rebellion of enlisted personnel. 
From the above theories, Trinkunas’ analysis of coup attempts in Venezuela  
where mid-ranking officers attempted coup in 1992,52 helps to explain the factors that led 
to insubordination of enlisted personnel during transition to democracy in Malawi. 
According to Trinkunas, an institutional outlook focused on civil-military relations is 
essential for coups to happen. He further asserts that after the 1958 transition to 
democracy, civilian consolidated control and management of the armed forces disunited 
the officer corps but satisfied both their personal and professional interests.  Furthermore, 
lack of consensus on the mission of the armed forces coupled with competition for 
supremacy between the army, the air force and the navy strengthened inter-service 
rivalries.53 For the Malawi case, the rivalries were between the two armed 
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organizations—the military and the MYP. Therefore, Trinkunas’ argument helps to 
explain the insubordination in Malawi because the explanation that caused the junior 
officers to resent and break with senior officers can be applied to explain break of bond 
between the enlisted personnel and senior military leadership in Malawi. 
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III. SECURITY FORCES IN MALAWI  
A. THE PERIOD 1964–1993 
To be able to understand the causes of the insubordination and rebellion of the 
enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force (MDF) during the democratization 
period, it is imperative that this chapter discusses the history of Malawi in brief between 
1964, when the country attained independence with Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda as the 
first native president, and 1993, when he was subjected to enormous pressure for a 
pluralistic political regime. This background will help in answering the question why the 
enlisted personnel of the MDF rebelled against senior military leadership during the 
democratization process because this period is characterized by buildup of tension 
between the MYP and the military. 
Banda became the first native president of Malawi in 1964. He was a medical 
doctor who graduated from Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee, 1937 and 
practiced his medicine profession in the United Kingdom after attaining medical 
Diplomas from universities of Glasgow and Edinburg in 1941.54 Banda was called by his 
counterparts in Malawi to lead them through non-violence independence struggle against 
British colonialists, and he went back to Malawi in 1958.55 Banda assumed the leadership 
of the Nyasaland Congress Party—a party that was already established by 1944 with Levi 
Mumba as its first president who died in the same year.56 However, during his first 
cabinet meeting in August 1964, Banda was confronted with opposition over both 
domestic and foreign issues in governing the country. Banda interpreted this action as a 
threat and required security mechanisms to be put in place for the survival and 
maintenance of the regime.57 
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Additionally, the effects of decolonization in Africa prompted Banda to organize 
separate armed entity to protect him from being ousted from power. Decolonization in 
Africa largely flourished after World War II, and most African countries inherited 
multiparty system of governance, which mutated into either authoritarian military rule or 
one-party systems, many of which underwent incapacitating civil wars.58 Decolonization 
in Africa was also characterized by political instability and military coups;59 hence 
Banda’s reign was vulnerable. This vulnerability forced Banda to create a more robust 
and loyal armed wing of the ruling party for the maintenance of the regime. Banda built 
two parallel armed organizations—the military and the MYP and favored the MYP after 
realization that the military would not serve his domestic political interests. 
Establishment and development of these armed organizations form the basis of the build 
of tension between them, which eventually led to the rebellion of enlisted members of the 
military during transition to democratization process thirty years after attaining 
independence from the British colonial rule. 
The chapter will also address how Malawi inherited the Malawi Defense Force 
from British colonial rule, with significant attention paid to how the military increased in 
force and equipment levels compared to the armed wing of the ruling Malawi Congress 
Party after 1964. Emphasis will be placed on matters regarding staffing, training, 
acquisition of equipment, deployment and the relationship between the enlisted personnel 
and senior leadership for the maintenance of morale within the defense forces. By 
scrutinizing and analyzing matters regarding staffing, training, acquisition of equipment 
and deployment of military resources in relation to the MYP, this thesis will be able to 
identify the root causes of resentment that consequently degenerated into rebellion of 
enlisted personnel during the transition phase of democratization in Malawi. The chapter 
will also discuss the formation, training and operations of the armed wing of the single 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) regime, known as the Malawi Young Pioneers Movement 
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(MYP) and will emphasize on how Banda made the MYP an elite force superior to 
regular military units with unclearly defined roles, thereby creating enormous tension 
between the MYP and the MDF during his period of tyrannical reign. The improper 
management of the tension was a necessary condition for the enlisted military personnel 
to launch an attack against the MYP, which consequently led to the disbandment of the 
MYP movement. These events also provided the environment necessary for 
democratization in the early 1990s. 
1. Brief History of Malawi 
Malawi is situated in southeast Central Africa. It is a landlocked nation bordered 
by Tanzania to the northeast, by Mozambique to the southeast and southwest, and by 
Zambia to the northwest. Owing to its elongated shape, Malawi has somewhat extreme 
dimensions: it is 901 kilometers in length and from 81 to 161 kilometers in breadth. It has 
a total surface area of approximately 118,484 square kilometers, 20 percent of which is 
water. Lake Malawi, Africa’s third largest lake, poses as a dominant feature of the 
country.  The lake extends in length a distance of 580 kilometers and has its outlet in the 
Shire River, which discharges into the Zambezi River.60 
Malawi became an independent state from British colonial rule on July 6, 1964, 
well ahead of both its earlier counterparts in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.61 
Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda became the first African president of the country under the 
Malawi Congress Party. The MCP was established in 1959 under the leadership of Orton 
Chirwa and Aleke Banda before Kamuzu Banda took over the leadership later in the  
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same year.62 In 1963, Banda created the MYP as an armed wing of the MCP emulating 
those of Ghana and Israel, and the 1965 constitution of Malawi made the MYP part of the 
security forces. 63 
In the same year, on 26 August, there was a cabinet crisis,64 following 
disagreements over domestic issues and international relations. The cabinet crisis is 
important in this thesis because this was the first instance that Banda showed his 
autocracy, and additionally, different reactions by both the military and the MYP could 
be seen as the tipping point for Banda to opt for robust militarization of the armed wing 
of the Malawi Congress party. Hence, this was the beginning of the buildup of tension 
between the two armed forces.  
A summary of unfolding events shows that Banda firstly quarreled with the 
members of his cabinet in July 1964 over disagreements on domestic administrative 
matters and foreign relations policy issues regarding the Peoples’ Republic of China 
(RoC) and Taiwan.65 While his ministers had extended invitation to mainland China, 
Banda extended an invitation to Taiwan because he did not want to be diplomatic relation 
with the communist China.66 The People’s Republic of China demanded that Taiwan not 
be part of the foreign diplomatic relationship—a thing that Banda did neither cooperated 
nor agreed. Consequently, Malawi had good foreign relations with Taiwan and South 
Africa, and received foreign aid from many western nations. However, Malawi was not 
willing to join the proposed African sanctions of boycotting the apartheid South Africa, 
and this ended up in worsening the already deteriorating foreign relations with 
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neighboring African countries. Banda’s refusal to cooperate with his cabinet ministers 
paved the way for a future and prolonged unstable internal political relationship. The 
foreign policy disagreement was quickly followed by what was then seen as the new 
government’s inconsiderateness and thoughtlessness evidenced by the introduction of 
hospital bills, the sluggish speed of Africanisation, and the meager salaries of native civil 
employees in contrast to the wages presented to the retained British officers.67  The slow 
process of Africanization meant that most key government positions that needed 
specialists were still occupied by the white settlers. This included all key command 
positions in the military and they helped maintaining old political professionalism within 
the organization.68  
It is against this background that the anxiety by the cabinet associates for 
improvements in the welfare and salaries of African civil servants immediately received 
the attention and massive support of the civil service in opposition to Banda. The open 
and clear confrontation enraged Banda and resulted in four cabinet ministers being 
dismissed, while two others resigned in dissatisfaction and reaction in September 1964.69 
In the meantime, the Malawi military machinery under white British officers observed 
the British custom of political disassociation and did not involve itself in the sprouting 
political crisis. However, some pockets of the Malawi Young Pioneers sided with Banda, 
and this initial backing was significant in the aftermath of the internal political battle.70 
This was the first time that extreme dictatorial and intolerant characters and traits of 
Banda surfaced. In view of the aforementioned, the MCP convention of October 1965 
adopted a constitution that made Malawi a single party state as the direct aftermath of the 
challenge to power presented during the 1964 Cabinet Crisis. The country became a 
republic in 1966 under the authoritarian rule of Banda.71  
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The cabinet crisis had a souring effect on the relationship between Malawi and its 
neighboring countries, which consequently had an effect on the domestic political 
dynamics of Malawi. The dismissed cabinet ministers were offered political asylum in 
Zambia and Tanzania. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia offered political asylum to 
Willie Chokani (Minister of Labor), Augustine Bwanausi (Housing and Development) 
and Rose Chibambo (Parliamentary Secretary), while President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania offered political asylum to Kanyama Chiume (Minister of External Affairs), 
Orton Chirwa (Minister of Justice) and Yatuta Chisiza (Home Affairs).72 Later, it will be 
shown in the chapter that some of these expelled ministers launched insurgency attack 
against Banda from Tanzania, during which both the military and more especially the 
MYP were deployed thereby displaying unclear roles and mandates of the two armed 
organizations. The ambiguity on roles of armed forces was also seen during Malawi’s 
involvement in the Mozambique civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Preceding to the cabinet crisis, Malawi had good foreign and political relations 
with Zambia because of their close ties ethnically and geographically. The Chewa and 
Tumbuka tribes are present in both countries, furthermore, Banda was given a lot of 
respect and credit for being in the lead in the destruction and dissolution of the federation 
of the three countries (Southern Rhodesia—Zambia, Northern Rhodesia—Zambia and 
Nyasaland—Malawi. Conditions degenerated when the removed ministers were accepted 
in Zambia. In September 1968, Banda’s claim that part of Zambian territory be annexed 
to Malawi worsened the relationship.73  
In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere made declarations that he would not allow 
the asylum seekers to launch an insurgency attack against Banda’s government. 
However, Banda made many extremely emotional accusations of an invasion led by the 
Malawi dissidents in Tanzania, and he then increased security measures in Malawi. The 
relationship between the two countries was exacerbated in 1967 when Tanzania claimed 
that the boundary between the two countries should be the median line through Lake 
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Malawi and Banda objected and maintained the boundary on the coastline. In the same 
year, there was an attempted coup by Yatuta Chisiza and a small group of followers, and 
the Tanzanian government did not stop Chisiza from executing his mission. Banda 
interpreted this as betrayal, so he collaborated with the Portuguese and White South 
Africans in terms of security assistance as a form of deterrence. The situation did not 
improve until 1972 when the relationship between the two countries was re-established.74 
Banda worked tirelessly to ensure that his opponents were completely eliminated 
from any presidential race. The first presidential elections were planned to be conducted 
in 1971. The elections were not held and the parliament with Banda’s influence declared 
him Life President of the MCP and Malawi.75 This implied that nobody should challenge 
Banda for the presidency until after his death. Additionally, Banda instilled a sense of 
fear in all political opponents and the general populace by claiming that the country was 
built on four corner stones or values, namely unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline. 
Any person who disobeyed any one or combination of these values was charged with 
treason forthwith. As an example, one of the ministers who was dismissed following the 
1964 cabinet crisis, Mr. Orton Chirwa, was charged with treason in 1981 and died in poor 
prison conditions in 1992.76 
Banda masterminded another murderous incident in 1983 when three ministers, 
namely Dick Matenje (Secretary General of the MCP), Aaron Gadama (Minister 
responsible for the Central Region) and Twaibu Sangala (Minister of Health) along with 
David Chiwanga, Member of Parliament for Chikwawa District, were peculiarly killed in 
what was formally branded as a “road traffic accident.” Banda had organized an in-house 
discussion on venturing toward multiparty democracy in Malawi, and the meeting was 
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conducted in the old capital city of Zomba. The three ministers expressed support for the 
introduction of multiparty politics, thereby effectively challenging inadvertently Banda’s 
claim to life presidency. This development annoyed Banda who in turn quickly dissolved 
the cabinet and intimated that the parliament would reconvene soon. The dissolution of 
cabinet portfolios meant that at the end of that parliamentary session, everyone in the 
chambers had effectively no virtual political rank or status. On 17 May 1983, the ex-
ministers were arrested at a roadblock mounted between Zomba and Blantyre and were 
taken to Eastern Region Police Headquarters for interrogation. They all spent the night in 
Mikuyu Prison near Lake Chirwa in the same district. On the following day, they were 
taken to Blantyre MCP regional sub-head office and later handed over to the Police 
Special Branch Center in Limbe town within Blantyre District. Under the cover of 
darkness at night, they were hooded, handcuffed and executed.77 Later, the bodies of the 
four men were put in one vehicle and driven to Thambani in Mwanza District, which is 
situated in the western part of the main commercial city of Blantyre. It was at this place 
where the “accident” was staged by rolling the car over an incline. It was alleged that the 
car had overturned while the men were attempting to escape into the neighboring country 
of Mozambique. Banda instructed that the caskets carrying the remains of the ministers 
not be opened for viewing and burial be conducted at night.78 A 1994 commission of 
enquiry revealed that the deceased had died of blunt force trauma inflicted by Banda’s 
secret security agents.79 
In the early 1990s, Banda encountered snowballing domestic political opposition 
from the general population. The opposition pressure was led by Mr. Chakufwa Chihana, 
a trade-union leader who later formed and led a political party—the Alliance for 
Democracy (AFORD). Banda was accused of violation of human rights and, above all, 
his authoritarian regime. Chihana was assisted by some opposition groups that were 
                                                 
77 Jan Kees Van Donge, “The Mwanza Trial as a Search for a Usable Malawian Political Past,” 
African Affairs Vol. 97, No. 386 (January 1998): 91-118, http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/current, 




functioning from outside the borders of the country. In March 1992 there were open calls 
for multiparty politics, and Roman Catholic Church leaders accelerated the process of 
regime change by issuing a pastoral letter condemning corruption and government 
censorship and monopoly of the media. In May 1992, there were nationwide industrial 
riots, which claimed more than 38 lives.80 Western nations suspended aid to Malawi in 
order to force Banda to respect human rights in accordance with international 
humanitarian law. In retaliation, Banda appointed an eight-member commission to 
oversee preparations for a national referendum on multiparty politics in January 1993. In 
the June 1993 referendum, Malawians voted overwhelmingly for multiparty political rule. 
Sixty-three percent of registered voters opted for the democratization of Malawi, after 
which Banda agreed to work with opposition groups towards a multiparty system. 
Several political parties were formed and in May 1994, following adoption of a new 
pluralist constitution, Banda lost the presidency by a substantial margin to Bakili Muluzi 
of the United Democratic Front (UDF) political party.81 
In summary, during Banda’s thirty-year authoritarian regime, there was no 
significant citizen participation in the political process, not even within the MCP, because 
Banda used the party and security structures as instruments to control and repress all 
potentially active affiliates. The MCP was efficient and well organized at the grass-roots 
level only as a policymaking arm of the regime and not as a channel for societal 
involvement in the political process. Under these conditions, a robust and autonomous 
civil society was, therefore, unable to develop. These findings will be relevant in this 
thesis they present the backbone of chain reaction of problems between the military and 
the MYP, when cabinet ministers confronted Banda in 1964 in trying to resolve the 
problems politically. 
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2. Inheritance of Malawi Defense Force from the British Colonial Rule 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to study the history of the Malawi 
Defense Force because the causes of the rebellion of the enlisted members of the defense 
force can be traced throughout the evolution of the Malawi Defense Force since 
attainment of independence in 1964. Until its independence, Nyasaland, now Malawi, 
was one of the countries in Africa under British colonial rule. The British needed military 
forces to safeguard against both internal and external aggression against its colonies.  In 
this regard, the King’s African Rifles (KAR) was a regiment created in 1902 with the 
principal objective of maintaining and supporting the colonial political order in the 
African colonies under the British administration.82 A resident governor in each colonial 
territory was specifically responsible and answerable to the Foreign Colonial Office in 
London.  The governor was also in charge and technically commander-in-chief of the 
resident KAR units. At lower tactical levels, the purpose of the KAR was to quash any 
opposition to colonial activities in East, Central, and Southern Africa.83 
The King’s African Rifles were British colonial army units deployed in Africa, 
stretching from the Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, to Tanganyika (Tanzania), Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia), Somaliland and Malawi. The majority of the troops were Africans 
and were commanded by British officers in order to articulate the strategic purpose of the 
colonial influence. The King's African Rifles comprised six battalions, and Malawi 
populated two battalions representing 30 percent of the regiment.84 
As an emerging state that was released from colonial captivity, Malawi inherited 
the defense force from its colonial masters.  In this light, Banda took over one battalion 
from the KAR after the attainment of independence in 1964.85 As part of the 
decolonization process, there were some related questions regarding defense and security 
of the new Malawi just as in the rest of the decolonized African countries.  The first 
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question to consider was what type of threats challenged the new state (internal or 
external)? Secondly, what institutions were needed to mitigate the anticipated threat?  
Lastly, how were military institutions organized, funded, trained, equipped, and how 
could establishment of effective command-and-control mechanisms be managed? Like in 
most Southern African countries, the armed forces were the most important structure of 
the government bureaucracy to be created because the military was seen not only as a 
national instrument to deal with internal and external security matters, but also as a 
material national symbol that participated in ceremonial functions and traditions 
representing the prestige of the newly independent nation.86 Banda maintained his 
oppressive regime, including elimination of internal political opponents, by directing his 
efforts on the buildup military and paramilitary structures. For the purpose of this thesis, 
developing the military matters because it was during this process that the generals were 
made to obey the president through corrupt practices, incentives and promotions. 
Through an act of parliament, a Defense Force Act was passed in February 1965 
for the provision of the establishment, enlistment, training, administration and general 
conditions of service of personnel in the Malawi Defense Force. The act also provided for 
components of reserve and militia forces and their command and control structures, and it 
stipulated that the prime minister was the commander-in-chief and had powers to appoint 
the military chief through a process that was regulated by the parliament.87 The 1966 
constitution gave Banda almost unlimited powers including the control of the military 
forces.88 
The military also continued to maintain the professional stance set up by the 
British by sticking to high recruitment and training standards and committing itself to 
faithfully serving the government. This was evidenced when it effectively suppressed an 
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insurgency by Chipembere in the Mangochi and Machinga districts in 1965 and the 
Yatuta Chisiza invasion of Mwanza district from Tanzania in 1967.89 The insurrection 
and invasion were just some to the reactions of the 1964 cabinet crisis aimed at 
overthrowing Banda from the throne. Banda developed other structures like the Police 
Mobile Services and the MYP to protect himself from opponents of the regime. Thus, 
during the fight against the insurgency, the military was deployed together with the 
MYP.90 It should be noted that the dual deployment of forces showed that Banda had no 
trust in the capabilities of the military 
Although Banda had little or no trust in the operations of the military because of 
their lack of support to domestic oppressive missions as shown during the 1964 cabinet 
crisis, he was determined to build a stronger defense force to maintain national security 
and sovereignty.91 In the thirty years of his rule, he increased the size of the military to 
nine battalions. In 1975, the Second Battalion (2 Malawi Rifle) was built and 
commissioned in Lilongwe, the capital city of Malawi. He named the battalion “Kamuzu 
Barracks” in honor of himself. The Defense Force headquarters buildings were located on 
the Second Battalion’s base. Several battalions were built, including a military training 
college in Salima District, also named Kamuzu Military College. By naming so a lot of 
infrastructure after himself, Banda intended to infuse a sense of fear in all subordinate 
commanders so they would not think of ousting him from power through military coups. 
The college facilitated all military training conducted within the borders of Malawi.92 
Although Banda developed the military, the MYP had better and essential 
infrastructure, resources and capabilities. The military had no air and maritime 
capabilities until 1978 when the maritime and air wings of the MYP were handed over to 
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them. This happened after the senior military leadership pleaded and convinced Banda 
that both assets and personnel be transferred to the military because the MYP was 
becoming much more stronger than the military. Thus, in 1978 the military inherited the 
MYP naval unit and the MYP Air Wing. The naval unit was called the Malawi Army 
Naval Unit (MANU) and was later changed to the Malawi Defense Force Marine Unit 
(MDF MU). The air wing was first called Malawi Army Air Wing (MAAW) but was 
later changed to Malawi Defense Force Air Wing (MDF AW). The air battalion is split 
into two: the fixed wing squadron based at Zomba and the helicopter Squadron based at 
Lilongwe.  Both squadrons are centrally administered from Zomba.93 
Integration of the two MYP units brought some added military capability, but the 
military personnel did not mix well with their MYP counterparts. The military hated the 
MYP counterparts because of its strict loyalty to the president and its intelligence 
network, which the MCP and Banda used for clandestine operations to eliminate political 
opponents. This is evident in derogatory names used by the military, names like 
“apayoniya” and “akayombe,” meaning, “You do not belong to the military. You still 
belong to the MYP establishment.” There was anger growing among the military 
personnel since Banda took over presidency in 1964. However, all the integrated MYP 
personnel have of late become extinct, and the military is now completely homogenous, 
in the sense that only conventional military trained personnel remain in the barracks. The 
last representation of the MYP rose to the rank of colonel and was the commanding 
officer of the maritime unit until September 2010 when he retired.94 
a. Military Involvement in Mozambican Civil War 
Malawi’s military participation in the Mozambican civil war mattered in 
contributing to the causes of insubordination of the military personnel during the early 
1990s. After ten years of struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, Mozambique attained 
independence in 1975. The anti-colonial movement Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) emerged to power. The sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese left 
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Mozambique with a distressed economy and essentially empty of an educated or trained 
workforce to manage the new country. An opposition group consisting of dissatisfied 
Portuguese and black Mozambicans, called the Resistancia Nacional Mozambicana 
(RENAMO), arose in 1979 under the leadership of Alfonzo Dhlakama to fight against the 
FRELIMO. Dhlakama wanted Mozambique to abandon Marxism-Leninism and allow 
multiparty, competition-type of politics.95 By the early 1980s, RENAMO had risen to a 
strength of over 6,000 fighters, attacking railway lines, electrical power lines, schools and 
hospital infrastructures.96 
Malawi as a geographically land-locked country relied on the Nacala and 
Beira Railway Corridors through Mozambique for both importation and exportation of 
important goods and services for international trade. Attacks on the railway lines by the 
RENEMO threatened the lifeline of Malawi’s international trade.  As the trade corridors 
became non-operational due to increased RENAMO activity, Malawi joined the 
Mozambican civil war on the side of Mozambique government soldiers, FRELIMO. The 
mission was to safeguard and protect the Nacala Corridor-Railway Line mainly from 
Nampula-Entre-Lagos, in order to allow for the safe passage of goods and 
commodities.97 The operation was named “Operation Kwaeni,” meaning “operation in a 
foreign country.” After the war, to the dismay of the Malawi military, it was discovered 
that Banda deployed the elite MYP to help the RENAMO rebels fight against the 
Mozambican government through covert operations, assisted by the apartheid South 
African government. Therefore, in the end Malawi military soldiers opposed MYP 
soldiers in a foreign country. This may have contributed to the buildup of anger by 
Malawi military personnel against the MYP. 
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b. Other Explanations Why Banda Gave the Military Limited 
Capabilities 
One of the reasons why Banda gave limited capabilities to the military was 
to eliminate the prospects of a military coup. During the Post-Colonial period, Africa was 
characterized by widespread of military coups especially throughout the first two decades 
of Banda’s rule.98 Since Ghana led the way to independence in Africa on 6 March 1957, 
by 1985 there were over 63 successful coup d’états and over 30 out of the 51 countries in 
the continent had experienced it.99 By limiting the military capabilities, Malawi was 
among the 17 countries that have never had a successful coup since independence. Others 
were Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 100 
The other factor was that bad prospects for political stability on the 
continent also had an effect on Banda’s downsizing the military. Accelerated population 
growth, speedy urbanization coupled with economic decline would provide the 
governments with less room to maneuver and more criticism from their unemployed 
young energetic men including soldiers.101 
3. Establishment and Roles of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and 
Dr. Banda’s Tyrannical Rule 
The MYP was established in 1963 as part of the League of Malawi Youth of the 
only and ruling Malawi Congress Party. The first trained group of the MYP102 became 
available in May 1964, two months before independence. The conception guiding the 
formation of the MYP was modeled after Kwame Nkrumah’s Young Pioneers in Ghana. 
Banda came back to Malawi in 1958 after he had lived in Ghana for some. From 1958, he 
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become politically active within the National African Congress Party (NAC), which later 
became the MCP. The MYP scheme was also modeled along Israel’s National Service 
Brigade and the kibbutz movement in order to enhance food security by improving 
methods of agriculture and working in Banda’s farms.103 Later, Israel provided the 
government of Malawi with critical support towards training military instructors for the 
MYP. Certain selected members of the MYP leaders were also given the opportunity to 
train Tel Aviv.104 Foreign relations with Israel, a renowned pariah state with widespread 
relations with apartheid regimes in South Africa, later influenced Malawi’s foreign 
policy, legitimizing the apartheid regimes in Southern Africa and instituting an 
ambassadorial office in Pretoria in 1967.105 The relations were strengthened by offering 
members of the MYP wide opportunities to train abroad in technical fields and 
commando-type operations, especially in South Africa, Israel and Taiwan. 
Prior to 1994, the Banda regime used suppressive measures and structures to 
maintain strict control of the whole population of Malawi. One of the most repressive 
structures was the MYP, which was comprised of approximately active 6000 personnel 
and about 45000 reserve personnel.106 MYP members were trained in the use of firearms, 
martial arts and battle tactics, and were armed with automatic weapons, mainly sourced 
from South Africa, Israel and Taiwan.107 Although the MYP were known to commit 
human rights abuses, their use contributed to the suppression of minor crime.108 As an 
example, the MYP were used to enforce procurement of MCP membership cards, and all 
citizens had to be members of this, the only party in Malawi. Without a party 
membership card, one could not enter market places, use public transport or even attend 
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classes (in the case of students).109 The selling of party membership cards was one of the 
means for raising funds for the MCP and its leadership, and this contributed to making 
Banda extremely rich. 
The MYP was the only elite security institution with robust capabilities. By 1968 
the MYP had fast patrol boats policing along the vast Lake Malawi, with bases at 
strategic locations including Metangula port in Mozambique where Banda had good 
bilateral ties with the colonial Portuguese regime. As much as it was important to 
maintain a dominance of security forces on the lake, it should have been the task of the 
military since such an assignment involved sovereignty of the country against 
Mozambique or Tanzanian external aggression. The military was not happy with the 
deployment of MYP personnel and resources on the lake, and hence, initiated inheritance 
of maritime resources in 1978. Furthermore, until 1978 the military and the Malawi 
Police Services (MP) did not have aerial capabilities, which the MYP enjoyed. The MYP 
had fixed wing and helicopter aircraft, which made them robust, elite forces of Banda. 
Regular soldiers, therefore, felt insecure and unsafe when a paramilitary wing of a 
political party had well-trained personnel with aerial and maritime capabilities, 
capabilities that should ideally have belonged to the military. 
Sophisticated resources and political devotion provided the MYP with a capacity 
far past that of the military. As the army continued to be confined to inherited barracks in 
Zomba and two other barracks built by Banda in Lilongwe and Mzuzu, by 1989 the MYP 
established training camps in all 24 districts of the country and recruited from all these 
areas.110 MYP personnel who completed training, especially those who showed 
leadership qualities, would then be sent to a central location for an advanced leadership 
training before being offered chances for further overseas training, or admitted to the 
University of Malawi or other training establishments like agricultural institutions, 
medical hospitals and automobile trade technical schools. Upon successful attainment of  
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required qualification, many members of the MYPs were then offered employment in 
private or public institutions that were controlled and financed by the ruling party. These 
institutions constituted part of an intelligence network throughout the country. The MYP 
were also deployed to protect government installations and conduct policing functions 
with powers and authority that superseded the police and military. 
The MYP were also used as an intelligence agency of the Malawi government to 
suppress political opponents and rule by coercion. Since the MYP was deeply rooted to 
the grass-roots level, domestic intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and 
covert operations could be executed with ease. Banda entrusted the MYP with 
intelligence capabilities because of their high level of subordination and training. Even 
military officers were not spared from MYP scrutiny. Additionally, members of the MYP 
were present in almost all public and private institutions.  In primary and secondary 
schools, the MYP provided students with civic education and physical fitness exercises. 
In their lessons, the core values and pillars of the MCP were emphasized.  Banda, 
therefore, instilled fear in the people of Malawi by orchestrating that the nation of 
Malawi was built on the four pillars of loyalty, unity, obedience and discipline.111 MYP 
members were also heavily represented in most technical colleges and the University of 
Malawi, serving as students while at the same time collecting information of intelligence 
value. The military and police intelligence systems were not trusted, and prior to 1994 the 
country had no national intelligence services. This is typical of non-democratic regimes 
where intelligence is mainly used to suppress political opponents.112 The MYP helped 
Banda to rule by coercion as in most non-democratic regimes.113 However, after 
democratization, the new democratically instituted National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) in 
2001, as part of security sector reform (SSR) and democratic consolidation subsequent to  
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a recommendation by the Inter-State Defense and Security Council (ISDC) of Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), called for such organizations to be 
established in all SADC countries.114 
Banda organized the display of MYP equipment and capabilities to show MYP’s 
might and superiority. Every year since 1968, an annual Youth Week Programme was 
organized every April overlapping with Banda’s birthday. Throughout this period, the 
youth and the MYP paraded with agricultural produce as well as latest military 
equipment.115 Since then, the MYP functioned as a superior organization to the Malawi 
military.  It was also embarrassing to the military to note that by 1985 the MYP had a 
lieutenant general as its commander, senior in rank to the military commander who was a 
major general at that time.116 
Military equipment procurement and training of MYP was done at the expense of 
the Malawi Defense Force (MDF). This happened in secrecy, but everything came to the 
surface after the disbandment of the MYP in 1993 when boxes of ammunition and 
equipment labeled “Malawi Defense Force” were recovered from overrun MYP bases. 
The use of military equipment by MYP personnel made them pompous and produced an 
overall demeaning effect on military personnel. This attributed to tension between the 
MYP and the MDF. The situation was exacerbated when the MYP was also entrusted 
with the provision of guard and security to the president. 
The senior military leadership was to blame for the MYP being in possession of 
military equipment. Since a country can only procure and acquire such equipment for 
military purposes, Banda used the military to procure such equipment. In other words, 
military equipment and resources were diverted to serve MYP and Banda’s political 
interests with the consent of senior military leadership. It is the responsibility of the 
Directorate of Logistics (DOL) of the MDF to procure military equipment upon the 
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approval of the Commander himself. With this in mind, it appears that junior military 
officers and all enlisted personnel felt betrayed by the senior leadership. 
Banda trusted the MYP more than the military and, hence, used the party wing as 
a repressive tool for his maintenance. Trust was fostered in the MYP mainly when they 
showed support during the 1964 cabinet crisis. Later Banda used the MYP to eliminate 
the Chipembere insurgents in Mangochi in 1973 alongside the military.  The MYP were 
loyal and merciless with political opponents according to Sindima, a renowned African 
philosopher: 
At 4 o’clock in the morning, one day in September in 1973, the security 
forces raided Moto village in Mangochi District. They captured 567 
people of all age groups, on ten trucks for detention in Dzeleka Prison 
Camp. Their homes were completely damaged, their property (cattle, 
goats, sheep, boats, sewing machines, beds, etc.) forfeited. Out of the 567 
only 371 returned after ten months of imprisonment and detention. The 
rest had died due to torture, poor diet and eating schedules, living in 
overcrowded cells, , and lack of medical attention and overworking.117  
The Malawi Young Pioneers Movement helped Banda keep Malawi under 
authoritarian control until the early 1990s. Growing domestic unrest including pressure 
from Malawian churches and from the international community created conditions and 
atmosphere for a referendum on the continuation of the one-party state.118  At the time, 
the enlisted military personnel—though officially insubordinated—mounted an attack on 
the MYP due to increasing pressure and hatred built up since 1964.  They resented 
Banda’s preference on training and equipping the MYP to maintain his oppressive 
regime. On June 14, 1993, the people of Malawi overwhelmingly voted for multi-party 
democracy. In the following year, on May 17 1994, free and fair national elections were 
held.119 
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To summarize this section of the chapter, under the authoritarian rule of Banda, 
the MYP were well trained and better armed than the regular force with equipment 
intended for the Malawi Armed Forces, with the intent that they maintain robust and 
oppressive non-democratic control.  This culminated in a historical dialectic between the 
military, the MYP, and the political system. This uneasy relationship, particularly 
between the Malawi Army and the MYP, dates back to the time proximately following 
independence and the cabinet crisis in 1964. As the MYP became increasingly armed and 
their work overlapped with the police and military, tension also increased exceedingly. 
The fact that its members served as intelligence agents and presidential guards, as well as 
architects of Banda’s tyrannical machinery, only aided in making them feared and hated 
by both the military and the public in general. The role of the MYP in the politics of 
Malawi progressed with the changing political environment of post-independence 
Malawi, especially after the 1964 cabinet crisis when Banda deemed it necessary to 
suppress and prevent political opposition. Throughout the cabinet crisis, Banda found the 
MYP better instruments of his terror tactics than police and the military. Banda created 
an environment in which the MYP functioned without professionalism of legal 
limitations and mandates that bound both the police and military. Banda used the MYP to 
suffocate and eliminate his political opponents. 
While Banda was busy arming and increasing the capabilities of the MYP, using 
military resources by conniving with senior military leadership, tension also increased in 
the military.  Mainly due to the competition for the scarce military resources, this also 
resulted in a lack of trust in the senior military leadership by the junior officers and the 
enlisted personnel as a whole.  Subsequently, exacerbated by the unclearly defined roles 
of the MYP, the dielectric between the military and the MYP triggered the disbandment 
of the MYP through insubordination of enlisted military personnel. 
Banda’s deployment of the MYP with no defined roles in both external and 
internal security matters also attributed to a buildup of tension between the military and 
the MYP.  Malawi military forces actually fought against the MYP when Banda ordered 
the military to assist the FRELIMO to protect the Nacala Railway Corridor, while the 
MYP conducted covert operations to assist RENAMO rebels during the Mozambican 
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civil war. The military was particularly unhappy when the MYP was given presidential 
guard functions and a lieutenant general was appointed the commander of the MYP, a 
rank superior to the major general who was the commander of the MDF in the 1980s. 
B. FINDINGS: CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 
Though this thesis focuses on the immediate causes and conduct of the Operation 
Bwezani, which was initiated by enlisted members of the Malawi Defense Force during 
transition to democratization in Malawi, importantly, the operation occurred within a 
broader political context. 
The period between 1992 and 1994 is considered the transition period from a 
single party regime to a pluralistic democratic regime of Malawi.  Due to growing 
pressure from both internal and international communities, Banda succumbed to 
democratic regime change. In March 1992, there were open calls for multiparty politics. 
The Roman Catholic Church played a vital role in hastening the process of regime change 
by issuing a pastoral letter condemning corruption and government censorship and 
monopoly of the media. In May 1992, there were nationwide industrial riots in which 
more than 38 lives were lost through police brutality.120 The police were not experienced 
in dealing with rioters and demonstrators. Demonstrations were strange phenomena 
because they were not allowed throughout Banda’s presidency. 
Additionally, western nations suspended aid to Malawi in order to force Banda to 
respect human rights in accordance with international humanitarian law. In retaliation, 
Banda appointed an eight-member commission to oversee preparations for a national 
referendum on multiparty politics in January 1993. In June 1993, a national referendum 
was held and Malawians overwhelmingly voted for multiparty political system of 
governance. Electoral results showed that 63% of registered voters opted for the 
democratization of Malawi, after which Banda agreed to work with opposition groups 
towards the modalities for the establishment of a multiparty system of governance. The 
country formulated and adopted a new constitution, and this allowed the formation of 
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several political parties. In May 1994, national presidential and parliamentary elections 
were held, and the results saw Banda losing the presidency by a significant margin to 
Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) political party.121 
Prior to the general elections in 1993, the MDF disbanded the armed wing of the 
MCP—the MYP—in an operation that was initially organized by enlisted personnel as a 
rebellion against the senior military leadership. The section will also address the issues 
regarding new roles of the Malawi military in the new democratic dispensation, an 
alternative explanation of the rebellion and, finally, the findings on the causes of the 
rebellious actions by the MDF enlisted personnel against the MYP contrary to the ethics 
of Malawi military doctrine. 
The preceding sections have shown that the Malawi military resentment over the 
MYP had been a longstanding issue in the politics of Malawi since of independence in 
1964. This resulted from Banda’s decision to implement and pursue national security 
policy using the single-party regime-affiliated armed wing (MYP) rather than the 
mandated Malawi military apparatus. The MYP was also very instrumental in eliminating 
political opponents. The enlisted members of the defense force expected the senior 
military leadership to solve the problems that rocked between the military and the MYP 
over a long period of time, but no action was taken by the generals.  None of the generals 
took appropriate measures to address the obvious and well-known problems that the 
military was facing. This part of the section will therefore, show how the existing tension 
developed into rage that prompted the enlisted personnel to engage the MYP in an armed 
conflict for the sole purpose of disarmament. Although it was through an act of poor 
military discipline, the outcome was fruitful in that all political parties were placed on 
equal footing for political competitiveness—all competing parties had no armed 
organizations affiliated to them for suppression of political opponents. This was an 
indication of direct support for democratic regime by the Malawi military. 
                                                 




The Crisis Group Africa Report contends that the “army’s well-deserved 
reputation for bad discipline and unwillingness to support democratic regime under 
civilian leadership is a function of its troubled past.”122 The report gives an example of 
Guinea, a country in West Africa, where the first two presidents both employed the 
military to pursue personal political ends. This tendency allowed the development of 
insubordination, and senior ranks excelled with patronage opportunities. The report 
further asserts President Lansana Conté’s reign was characterized by mutinies, due to 
poor work conditions, and irregular recruitment following ethnic lines. The conditions in 
the military worsened when a junta took over the reign after the president’s death in 
December 2008. Under the junta leadership of Dadis Camara, the army was used to 
suppress political opponents. This further strengthened the tension between the junta, the 
armed forces and a recruited ethnic militia with competing and overlapping structures.123 
The case of Guinea is similar to that of Malawi because of the military prolonged 
resentment over the MYP and consequently the MCP and Banda’s authoritarian regime. 
However, in Malawi, there is no evidence to suggest or indicate that military or police 
personnel recruitment was based on tribal or ethnic influence or preference.124 
Recruitment was done through a quota system in every administrative district, and this 
helped to have harmonious co-existence of all tribes within the Defense Force. 
The establishment of various opposite and overlapping armed structures and the 
handling meted out to senior officers destroyed the army’s morale and planted the seeds 
of distrust between the armed forces and civilian power. This also made the armed forces 
less attractive for the youth to join. The consequent military resentment and distrust of 
civilian power created necessary conditions for President Conté’s rise and his successive 
eradication of his predecessor’s civilian power base.125 In Malawi, Banda created similar 
multiple competing and overlapping armed structures and capitalized on subjective 
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control126 of the military in order to instill complete loyalty, especially in the senior 
leadership. Banda used several mechanisms in his management and control of the 
military with emphasis on maximizing personalized civilian power while minimizing 
military power. Firstly, he promoted middle senior officers to very senior officers and 
appointed them to command the military for long periods of time. As an example, in 
1972, Banda promoted Lieutenant Colonel Glaciano Matewere twice, first to the rank of 
Brigadier and then to the rank of Major General and, still later, appointed him as the 
commander of the Malawi Defense Force.127 Brigadier Clement, the inherited, British, 
former military commander became the advisor to the military. Banda further announced 
that the appointment of the African military commander (General Matewere) marked the 
end of his Africanization program.128  
Another subjective control mechanism to manage the military was the provision 
of personal incentives to senior military leaders. In order to instill and reinforce loyalty, 
Banda gave some senior military officers certain sums of money to reward merit and 
excellence. On being promoted to certain senior ranks, some officers were given loans for 
the acquisition of land to venture in commercial agriculture. Furthermore, the military 
personnel had higher wages than analogous members of the civil service. This was done 
in order to buy loyalty and extreme patriotism, especially from the senior military officers 
who would in turn manage and suppress the junior officers and the enlisted personnel.129 
Failure of the senior military leadership to solve the problems rocking the military 
due to generals’ loyalty and patriotism to the president, enhanced by civil pressure for 
regime change, prompted the enlisted personnel to make a decision against the MYP. 
Additionally, due to Banda’s old age and growing pressure by both the internal civil 
society and the international donor community for change to a democratic regime in 
Malawi and many countries in the African Continent, Banda’s authoritarian and 
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oppressive regime gradually became vulnerable while the MYP remained a hated 
powerful armed organization. Thus on 1 December 1993, the enlisted members of the 
MDF started an armed operation to disarm the MYP without proper orders from the 
senior military leadership, and within two weeks the MYP was effectively disarmed and 
disbanded.  
The disarmament of the MYP was purely initiated by enlisted members of the 
MDF without officer coups’ leadership. The enlisted personnel were regular military 
members who were recruited and trained by the government of Malawi. In Malawi, the 
minimum age for recruitment is 18 years and after serving for 7 years, the soldiers are 
allowed to retire or sworn in for re-engagement for long service active duty until the age 
of 55 when they go for mandatory retirement. The 1965 Defense Force Act also provided 
for enlisted employees of the MDF to retire after serving for a period of 10 years. 
Administratively, the enlisted personnel get salaries and terminal benefits from the 
Malawi Government. However, the enlisted personnel had poorer welfare conditions 
compared to the officer corps. As an example, the enlisted personnel were housed in very 
small one to two bedroom quarters and children over 18 years of age were not permitted 
to live with their parents while the officer coup were given very big houses and there was 
no limitations for children or dependents. Higher officers’ remuneration packages further 
widened the gap with the enlisted personnel. Additionally, within the officers’ corps, 
privileges increased as one climbs up the promotion ladder. Thus, unlike the 
insubordination of in Venezuela, the junior officers in Malawi could not initiate or join 
the rebellion at early stages because they had to be loyal to the senior officers’ corps who 
were responsible for their consideration for promotions and welfare.130 
From the discussion of this paper, there are four main causes that resulted in the 
rebellion of the enlisted personnel of the Malawi Defense Force during the transition to 
democratization of Malawi. The first cause that brought tension was the competition for 
military resources between the military and the Malawi Young Pioneers. The MYP 
showed solidarity and loyalty to Banda after the cabinet crisis in 1964 when the country 
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had just attained independence from British colonialism. The MYP’s support of Banda 
when he fired the six cabinet ministers after disagreements over issues on foreign policy, 
low speed of Africanization and lower wages of African government workers compared 
to white settlers, forced him to equip the MYP with highly sophisticated weapons. Banda 
decided to train and equip the MYP to the teeth so that he could use it as oppressive 
machinery against political rivals and maintain the authoritarian regime. This is 
evidenced by the acquisition of aircraft and watercraft in 1978 when the military had no 
such resources. The MYP also enjoyed military training abroad in countries like Israel 
and Taiwan. Locally, the MYP personnel were privileged to receive academic and 
technical education in all tertiary institutions, including the University of Malawi where 
the military had no such opportunities. More evidence of competition of resources was 
brought into the open during Operation Bwezani in 1993 when equipment labeled 
“Malawi Defense Force” was captured from MYP bases throughout the country. The 
superiority of the MYP was one of the sources of tension that caused enlisted personnel 
to take action when senior military leadership was unwillingness to do so. 
The second cause of the rebellion of the MDF enlisted personnel was the poorly 
defined roles of the MYP, which was seen as encroaching on military roles. At the very 
beginning, the MYP were deployed as the presidential guard, an indication that Banda 
trusted and preferred the MYP to the MDF. This made the MYP pompous and had a 
degrading effect on the country’s military. Obviously, the members of the military were 
not happy with this type of deployment, and the enlisted personnel expected their senior 
leadership to do something about it. The issue of unclear roles became prominent when 
the MYP duplicated and assumed some of the functions of the military and the police. 
Apart from political oppression and maintenance of the regime, the MYP were also used 
for both internal and external security. This made the MYP a predominant security force 
in the country, and it enjoyed an enormous amount of funding and resources.  
Malawi’s involvement in double-dealing in the Mozambican civil war also fueled 
tension between the MYP and the MDF. Because of the same issue of unclear roles, 
Banda made the MYP virtually fight against the MDF between 1982 and 1992. In an 
effort to insure safe passage of imports and exports through Beira and Nacala Ports in 
 48 
Mozambique, the Malawi military was ordered to guard railway lines connecting Malawi 
to the seaports of Mozambique in support of government FRELIMO forces. On the other 
hand, Banda deployed the MYP, which acted as a conduit between South African 
apartheid regime forces and the Mozambican RENAMO insurgent forces. During this 
period, MDF General Melvin Khanga was put in an awkward position and likewise, both 
officers’ corps and the enlisted personnel expected stern and bold action from the 
general.131 
Furthermore, the MYP assumed a more dominant security role in 1967 when it 
was deployed to crush insurgents in Mangochi District in the southern part of the country. 
This task was supposed to be undertaken by the military, but due lack of trust Banda 
deployed the MYP. The military felt relegated to mere reserve forces, and this was 
another source of long standing resentment.132 
Banda’s employment of the MYP as national intelligence agents for all matters 
regarding national security was another source of tension with the military. For effective 
execution of oppressive activities and maintenance of his regime, Banda deployed the 
MYP to collect information for intelligence analysis and covert operations in all 
government and private institutions including schools and colleges. While intelligence 
function is carried out an independent national intelligence unit or the military, the 
Malawi military personnel were not spared from being victims of the intelligence 
gathered by the MYP.133 
The third reason for the cause of the insubordination of the enlisted personnel is 
corruption among generals’ and officers’ promotion goals within the military. In order to 
achieve suppression and subjective control of the military, Banda used corrupt practices, 
especially among the senior military leadership. Banda gave loans to generals to acquire 
land and venture into agribusiness and, upon being promoted to certain senior ranks; 
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these corrupt incentives were by deliberate default in exchange of loyalty. Senior officers 
stayed loyal to Banda in order to enjoy these privileges. This made the senior officers and 
all the generals reluctant to confront the commander-in-chief of the defense force 
regardless of problems and tension that rocked between the military and the MYP. The 
worst case scenario of corruption is registered when the generals diverted equipment and 
ammunition meant for the military to MYP bases, consequently making the MYP more 
dominant force than the military itself. The enlisted personnel of the military obviously 
interpreted this as betrayal of their own organization since the generals were serving both 
military and MYP interests. Lack of military professionalism may also have contributed 
to such type of grave corrupt practices since resources meant for the military should be 
procured and provided in accordance with national grand strategies and security interests. 
The corrupt relationship that existed between the generals and Banda made it extremely 
difficult for the generals to confront him to sort out the issues and ease tension between 
the military and the MYP. 
The fourth factor leading to the cause of the insubordination of the enlisted 
personnel is lack of incentives among senior military leadership to confront the president 
(due to the great power wielded by the executive under “presidentialism” in Africa)134 to 
push for free and fair democratic elections. Again, corruption and the close relationship, 
coupled with loyalty, made the generals completely subjectively controlled by Banda. 
The generals also benefitted from Banda’s authoritative regime, so there was no reason 
for them to confront Banda to change to a pluralistic regime. The result was the 
breakdown of relationship between the enlisted personnel and senior military leadership. 
Throughout Banda’s authoritative regime, there was a growing tense relationship 
between the MYP and the military due to Banda’s preferred treatment of the MYP, which 
made it a dominant security force in the country for regime maintenance and suppression 
of political opponents. Failure of the generals to confront Banda in order to resolve the 
issues between the MYP and the military ultimately erupted in the rebellion of the 
enlisted personnel when they engaged the MYP in an armed disarmament operation—
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Operation Bwezani—in December 1993 during transition to democracy. Consequently, 
the disarmament of the MYP helped all the political parties to be on the same power base, 
thereby creating a conducive environment for the free and fair elections held in May 
1994.135 Even without insubordination of the enlisted military personnel, the political 
culture of the country warranted military intervention to sustain the new emerging 
democracy. 
The above findings are in line with literature as provided by Norden and 
especially Trinkunas,136 who analyzes the 1992 coup attempts in Venezuela, and argues 
that an institutional outlook focused on civil-military relations is required to appreciate 
why coups happen. He contends that “in Venezuela after the 1958 transition to 
democracy, civilians consolidated control of the armed forces in accordance with 
institutions that disunited the officer corps but satisfied their personal and professional 
interests.”137 Furthermore Trinkunas asserts that lack of consensus on the mission of the 
armed forces and competition for supremacy between the army, the navy and the air force 
deepened inter-service rivalries.138 Struggles to curry favor with politicians aggravated 
the rivalries and contributed to resentment among junior officers towards the highly 
politicized, corrupt senior officer corps.  
As for the case of Malawi, the disunification was between enlisted personnel and 
the officer corps, lack of consensus on the roles, mission and supremacy was between the 
military and the armed wing of the MCP, and there was resentment among the enlisted 
members of the towards the highly politicized and corrupt senior members of the MDF. 
Additionally, as evident in Trinkunas’ analysis of the Venezuelan case, a lack of attention 
to defense policies and spending by the civilian politicians also lead to insubordination in 
Malawi. Banda gave more resources and budget to the MYP and made it more robust 
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than the military because he wanted to use the MYP for maintenance of regime and 
political oppression. This contributed to competition of military resources between the 
two armed organizations. 
C. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE REBELLION 
Although the disbandment of the MYP was a result of rebellion of the enlisted 
personnel, the military in general had the entire disposition and occasion139 to intervene. 
According to Finer, the military has the prerogative to rise against authoritarian regime 
and facilitate in the democratization process. Military intervention in the democratization 
process of Malawi was legitimized when the Malawi National Consultative Council 
(NCC)—a forum that had a strong impact on the Parliament (National Assembly) and the 
Executive arm of the government, and which was also responsible for the effective 
oversight of the democratization process—called on the military to eliminate the MYP by 
either assimilating it into the military or the police. The majority of the members of the 
MYP were angry with this suggestion and became progressively hostile.140 From the 
above analysis, Malawi belongs to the fourth order of minimal political culture because 
during democratization, the country had weak institutional arrangements and the many 
people were still affected by stigma due to the presence of Banda’s widespread repressive 
machinery—the MYP. From figure 1, the MDF had two options of military intervention. 
The military could either displace or supplant Banda’s regimes while reorganizing the 
country for democratic elections. Since the MYP was becoming increasingly hostile, both 
actions would mean armed conflict between the MYP and the MDF. Although the 
military had support from the general public to legitimize their actions against the MYP, 
such legitimization was not important as long as the MYP was disbanded and destroyed. 
Neutral and secure environment for political campaigns in accordance with the above 
model of military intervention existed. It can comfortably be commented that even 
without the act of insubordination, the MYP still had to be destroyed for the 
democratization process to succeed in Malawi. Such action would, however, require one 
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of the generals either to confront Banda or displace the minister responsible for the 
operations of the MYP (supplantment of the civilian regime). In this case, legitimacy of 
military intervention was unimportant provided that the MYP and its leadership were 
displaced to create an atmosphere conducive to pluralistic rule of governance. 
However, Finer’s theory and analysis of political culture and military intervention 
cannot explain why the enlisted members of the MDF rebelled against senior military 
leadership in Malawi. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter gives a summary of the main findings of the causes of the rebellion 
of the enlisted members of the Malawi Defense that happened during the transition to 
democracy. The chapter also outlines some internal security measures and 
counterterrorism efforts that Malawi made after democratization in line with the new 
roles and mission of the military. Finally, the author has prescribed and provided some 
recommendations. 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has postulated that lack of commitment and incentives by generals to 
solve long standing issues between the military and the Malawi Young Pioneers resulted 
in the breakdown of soldier-officer relations and ultimately the rebellion of the enlisted 
members of the Malawi Defense Force. The period 1964–94 was characterized by 
Banda’s authoritarian regime and the build-up of tension between the military and the 
MYP. During this period, Banda used a variety of mechanisms to make the generals loyal 
to him, and this consequently rendered the generals incapable to confront him to solve the 
problems rocking the MYP and the military since he was the commander in chief of both 
armed organizations. The enlisted members of the military took advantage of the 
situation when internal and external pressures were exerted on Banda to allow the 
country to switch to democratic regime in 1993, to disarm the MYP through armed 
confrontation without orders from senior military leadership. 
Since 1964, Banda had been using the armed wing (MYP) of the Malawi 
Congress Party as both repressive machinery for political opponents and maintenance of 
tyrannical authoritarian regime. The preference to employ the MYP for personal 
aggrandizement was a source of tension with the military throughout Banda’s tenure of 
office. This resulted in competition of military resources since Banda was forced to divert 
equipment and resources meant for the military to equip and arm the MYP to the teeth so 
that the MYP could be able to implement his policies without failure. The MYP was 
therefore a dominant force in Malawi because it was the organization that had air and 
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maritime capabilities. However, in 1978, all the watercraft and aircraft were transferred 
to the military and police establishments and tension was aggravated. 
Another source of tension was the provision of special treatment to the MYP. In 
order to maintain combat readiness and professionalism, the MYP members were trained 
in military institutions outside Malawi. The MYP attained training in Israel, Taiwan and 
South Africa. Locally, the MYP had training bases in all the 24 districts of the country 
and those who displayed good leadership skills were sent to the University of Malawi and 
other technical colleges for tertiary education. The military did not have such privileges 
and had only one training establishment located at Zomba. 
Furthermore, the MYP felt that their existence was more important than the 
military due to their use of military ranks and structure. The situation was exacerbated 
when Banda promoted the commander of the MYP to a rank superior to the commander 
of the military. This made the MYP a powerful dominant force in Malawi and nobody in 
the military could gather courage to approach Banda because of his presidentialism 
policies.141 It was therefore important for the country to undergo regime change and 
democratization so that only legitimate and monopolized use of force could be used by 
the elected civilian official and the state institutions. This could also help the senior 
military leadership to be responsible to the state rather than authoritarian individual who 
wanted to use force for domestic political oppression. 
During Banda’s tenure in office, there was no clear demarcation between the roles 
of the military and the MYP. This resulted in further strengthening the tension between 
the organizations. In 1967, the MYP was deployed to deal with insurgent group in 
Mangochi district. This is a role that should have ideally been given to the military but 
was not so because Banda doubted the capability and effectiveness of the military 
probably due to their inadequate resources and lack of expertise. Banda also doubted 
loyalty of the military as it did not support his actions right from the 1964 cabinet crisis. 
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The issue of unclear roles reached climax during the 1982-92 Mozambican civil 
war when the military was virtually deployed in direct confrontation with the MYP. In 
order to secure and provide safe lanes for the transportation of Malawi commodities for 
international trade, the military was tasked to safeguard Beira and Nacala railway lines 
connecting Malawi to the seaports of Mozambique. To fulfill this mission, Malawi 
military was deployed to aid the FRELIMO government forces. On the other hand, the 
MYP was deployed to aid the insurgency group RENAMO, which also received support 
from the White South African apartheid regime. The MYP acted like a conduit through 
which South Africa delivered its support to the insurgent RENAMO forces. The ultimate 
consequence was that Banda played double standards by deploying two forces from 
Malawi against each other in a foreign country. This was another reason for the bone of 
contention for tension and hatred between the two armed organizations.  The 
insubordination of the enlisted personnel was also partly due to poor civil-military 
relations. As in most African authoritarian regimes, the military in Malawi were directly 
responsible to the president without any oversight mechanisms. The lack of oversight 
mechanisms gave leeway for the generals to play double standards in serving the interests 
of both the military and the MYP as evidenced by MYP’s possession of military 
equipment, which came to open during Operation Bwezani. Since the first elected 
government in May 1994, Malawi is still struggling to consolidate its democracy.  
The period 1964–94 was also characterized by the use of the MYP as the only 
national intelligence agency of Malawi. In almost all authoritarian regimes the use of 
intelligence agencies was a significant way of maintenance of power.142 Bruneau and 
Borazi also contend that in non-democratic regimes, these intelligence agencies have 
been heavily relied upon for maintenance of centrality to power and elimination of 
domestic political opposition.143 The intelligence apparatus came under direct military 
control in the case of countries with military regimes, while in the former socialist and 
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communist countries they were a combination of defense force and civilian agencies.144 
Malawi poses as a unique case because the intelligence apparatus neither came from the 
military nor the civilian agencies. Banda used the armed wing of the ruling political party 
to provide the intelligence function necessary for the survival and maintenance of the 
regime.  The MYP was deployed to grass-root level, including all public and private 
institutions to ensure effective and successful domestic and external intelligence 
collection for Banda’s regime survival. However, the military was not spared from 
MYP’s intelligence process cycle. This further strengthened the uneasy relationship that 
existed between the two armed organizations. 
From the discussion of this thesis, the rebellion of the enlisted personnel of the 
Malawi Defense Force during the transition phase of democratization was caused mainly 
by five factors: Competition for military resources between the MDF and the MYP; 
corruption among generals; Officers’ promotion goals; poorly defined roles of the MYP, 
which was seen as encroaching on military duties especially when the MYP worked as 
the presidential guard; and lastly little incentive among senior military leadership to 
confront the president (due to the great power wielded by the executive under 
“presidentialism” in Africa) to push for free and fair democratic elections. These facets 
made the generals to fail to resolve the long standing issues between the military and the 
MYP. Taking advantage of both internal and external pressure on Banda to allow regime 
change to pluralism, on first December 1993, the enlisted personnel engaged the MYP in 
an armed conflict without orders from the generals in an operation that was later named 
Operation Bwezani. Later junior officers joined and provided command and control in 
the operation and all the MYP bases were captured. Consequently, the effective 
disarmament of the MYP created conducive environment for free and fair elections in 
May 1994. The results of the elections saw the opposition leader Bakili Muluzi (under 
United Democratic Front) taking over the presidency from Banda. Banda was given 
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recognition for handing over power to the new multi-party president without resistance. 
Banda died on 17 November 1997 due to grand old age and sickness in South Africa.145 
The period 1994 to 2004 is marked by activities in pursuit of consolidation of the 
newly acquired democracy. During this period, democratic reform of the military and 
intelligence systems were attempted in order to achieve democratic control of both the 
military and intelligence. It should however be noted that consolidation to mature 
democracy is an on-going process, and if not well managed, the country may slip back to 
authoritarian regime. One of the activities to achieve democratic control of the military 
was to establish institutions that helped to enhance civil-military relations, which were 
completely non-existent during Banda’s reign. The spread of ministries of defense 
(MOD) in the “third wave”146 did not spare Malawi in the creation of at least formal 
civilian control. Malawi established the MOD in 1994 to provide the military with 
administration and human resource management, strategic planning, policy formulation, 
management and evaluation of projects, and preparation and implementation of 
budgets.147 In addition, the MOD set the following strategic objectives:  
Maintain a healthy, well trained, equipped, disciplined and gender sensitive, 
combat    ready sustainable size force; develop and manage defense policies, strategic 
plans and legal instruments; develop and promote civil-military relations; provide 
military assistance to civil authorities in times of emergencies; support civil police in the 
maintenance of law and order; promotion of regional peace and international order.148 
In compliance with the new roles and missions derived by the MOD, the military 
has been actively participating in internal security matters and UN peacekeeping efforts 
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mostly in African war-torn regions. As part of internal security, the military is entrusted 
with provision of safety security to both equipment and personnel during elections. While 
the MOD has achieved civilian control of the military, it has not been very effective in 
implementation of its outlined projects like the construction of gallery range and 
explosive store houses at Marine Unit in Monkey probably due lack of adequate funding 
and appropriate staff.  
Furthermore, democratic consolidation in Malawi is characterized by democratic 
control of intelligence. Bruneau and Borazi argue that one of the conditions necessary for 
the fulfillment of the definition of consolidated democracy is ability of the elected 
government to control and oversee intelligence.149 This can be achieved by intelligence 
reform since the survival of authoritarian regimes was heavily relied on intelligence as 
was the case with Banda. Malawi created a completely new institution called the National 
Intelligence Services (NIS) without any legal framework to provide oversight and 
democratic control of intelligence. Additionally, in a democracy, the intelligence 
community must be independent of other arms of the government in order to produce 
nonpartisan or unpoliticized intelligence necessary for the policy and national decision 
makers to be able to safeguard national security. The elected civilian president and the 
national security department must be able to formulate policy and set priorities of 
required and requested intelligence. The intelligence community must therefore be 
directed by qualified civilian officers if possible. In Malawi, due to lack qualified civilian 
intelligence officers, the director of NIS is an active service Brigadier General on 
secondment. 
B. INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN MALAWI 
Since the introduction of a polyarchy rule of governance in 1994, Malawi has 
embarked on continuous150 process of consolidation of democracy through institution 
building and, most importantly, civilian management of the military and the intelligence 
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system. The country’s military and Police Services have undergone Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) to ensure that the military and police are under complete civilian control in 
order to realize meaningful democracy. This is emphasized by Dahl—a professor of 
Political Science at Yale University as he asserts that: 
In order for a state to be governed democratically, evidently two 
conditions are required: 1) If military and police organizations exist, as 
they surely will, then they must be subject to civilian control. But civilian 
control, while necessary, is not sufficient, for many nondemocratic 
regimes also maintain civilian control. Therefore, 2) the civilians who 
control the military and the police must themselves be subject to the 
democratic process.151 
In order to achieve civilian control of the armed forces, Malawi established 
institutions such as the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Council to which the 
military commander is responsible. The Defense Council gives recommendations on the 
exercise of powers of the President over the military.152 The 1994 Constitution of Malawi 
also allowed that the Defense Security Committee of the National Assembly (DSCNA) 
shall have proportionate representation of all political parties having seats in the National 
Assembly.153 Members of the DSCNA serve for a period of one year only and can 
assemble at any time; the DSCNA has such powers and functions conferred by the 
constitution and Acts of Parliament.154 Furthermore, the military has been engaged in 
regional training activities in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and Western countries, thereby, enhance its professionalism and in particular, the 
realization of the principle of the supremacy of the civil power155 in a democratic 
government. Such training has also helped the military officers to understand the civilian 
authorities and national policies in order to effectively and efficiently implement them. 
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The military displayed its old professionalism by its non-intervention156 when 
disgruntled members of some political parties were dissatisfied with results of general 
elections. After both the 1994 and 1998 general elections, the media reported that 
dissatisfied supporters of the losing opposition parties called on the senior military 
leadership to intervene, but the military refrained themselves from such involvement. The 
department of defense, through its public relations department, went further to publish a 
press statement stipulating that it was never in the interest of the military to actively 
participate in party politics. In this regard, the military showed professionalism by 
stressing that they would only serve an elected government.157 This implies that for 
Malawi democracy is now “the only game in town.”158  
However, the Malawi military has shown involvement in multi-party politics with 
its new roles and missions in accordance with the new constitution of the country. Thus, 
democracy brought new military “professionalism of internal security and national 
development”.159 From 1994, the military has provided internal security in support of 
police functions as stipulated in the constitution and the Defense Force Act. One of the 
notable internal security measures is the provision of a safe and secure environment 
during the electoral process, where soldiers are deployed right from the local polling 
stations to the country’s main tally center. Armed soldiers are deployed together with 
police offices to all the centers on the eve of the polling day. Their main function is to 
quell any disruptions during the voting process and report to higher headquarters 
accordingly. The military are also involved in the security and movement of all voting 
equipment, including ballot papers, throughout the country. Military assets are used for 
this exercise, but the military gets instructions from civilian authorities with the National 
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Electoral Commission (NEC) in line with management and control of the military in 
consolidated democracies.160 Just like in Peru, Malawian “leaders have decided that only 
the military personnel can guarantee the right of all citizens to vote,”161 and hence 
entrusted with internal security during elections. 
Additionally, the multi-party era and political situation has made the MDF 
develop and forge ahead with new relations in the SADC region through its active 
involvement in the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) since 1996.162 
The military has also gained international recognition through active participation in 
United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the world. Under Chapter VI, VII and 
VIII of the UN Charter,163 Malawi has been deploying military observers and contingent 
troops to Rwanda, Kosovo, Madagascar, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Southern Sudan, Darfur and the Ivory Coast on a recent UN Mission.164 
Participation in UN peacekeeping operations has boosted the morale and welfare of the 
soldiers through interaction with other militaries and most importantly, the economic 
gains are enormous considering the low wages in the armed services, especially in the 
enlisted personnel. The economic returns have assisted to narrow the gap between the 
officers’ corps and the enlisted personnel that has been present since Banda’s era. 
The post Banda era has also been characterized by peacekeeping training of the 
Malawi military by the United States. Since 1996, the U.S. has been training African 
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countries in an effort to meet the increased demand in peacekeepers.165 Through the 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and African Contingency Operations Training 
and Assistance (ACOTA), Malawi has received peacekeeping capacity-building 
assistance from U.S. government.166 The assistance has helped the Malawi military to 
effectively participate in UN peacekeeping initiatives worldwide. 
Furthermore, as part of consolidation of the democratization process, Malawi has 
put national intelligence system in place to support the policy and decision makers with 
regard to national security matters. Lowenthal asserts that each nation must have 
intelligence agencies to prevent strategic surprise by the enemy, provide long-term 
expertise, support policy process and maintain the secrecy of information, needs and 
means.167 However, during Banda’s non-democratic regime the intelligence community 
(MYP) was heavily relied upon for maintenance of centrality to power and elimination of 
domestic political opposition.168 With introduction to multi-party politics, a completely 
new national intelligence system, was set up without the influence of the previous 
authoritarian intelligence system, which was completely crashed by the Malawi Defense 
Force during the democratization transition. 
One of the conditions necessary for a consolidated democracy is the ability of the 
elected government to have democratic control of intelligence.169  Thus, if the chosen 
government even through the ballot does not control intelligence, it is by definition 
deemed not a consolidated democracy since democratic consolidation requires both 
institutions and the culture of practicing democracy. Democratic control of intelligence 
involves provision of direction, oversight and accountability of the Intelligence 
Community (IC). Bruneau and Steven contend that “direction is civilian guidance to a 
nation’s IC with respect to entire mission. This guidance is usually embodied in some 
form of national security strategy including day-to-day feedback that an intelligence 
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organization will receive from the civilian officials it serves.”170 On the other hand, 
“oversight identifies the processes that a democratic government puts in place in order to 
review all aspects of an intelligence community’s organization, personnel, budget, 
management, and legal framework for effective intelligence operations.”171 To achieve 
civilian control of the IC, the elected government may utilize the following five 
mechanisms: executive control, legislative control, judicial control, internal and external 
control mechanisms. Different countries apply these control mechanisms differently 
depending on the civilian preferences and the enacted law with regard to national 
intelligence agencies.172 In Malawi, most of the oversight is provided by the executive 
since it is the main beneficiary of national intelligence. 
In order to achieve democratic control of intelligence, the whole intelligence 
system requires sector reform. Since the only intelligence organization in Malawi (MYP) 
was disbanded, Malawi formulated a completely new National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) 
during the first term of the multi-party system of government under President Muluzi. 
The NIB was created without any basis for legal or constitutional framework.173 
However, after the 2008 presidential elections, the NIB was a source of political tension 
between the outgoing president and ruling President Bingu Wa Mutharika, who was 
hand-picked by Muluzi. After failing to manipulate the constitution in order to have a 
third term of reign, Muluzi campaigned vigorously for Bingu thinking that he would still 
continue to rule the country by having  Bingu as a puppet president. This did not 
materialize since Bingu abandoned the party that brought him to power (the United 
Democratic Front -UDF), and instead started his own party called the Democratic 
Peoples’ Party (DPP). Mutharika dissolved the NIB and formed the National Intelligence 
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Services (NIS) to deal with all matters regarding intelligence and national security. The 
NIS was created also without legal framework.174 
In sum, since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1994, Malawi has 
embarked on developing military and national intelligence institutions that are managed 
and controlled by elected civilian authorities in pursuit of democratic consolidation. The 
post Banda era is characterized by military involvement in internal security matters, 
regional participation in defense and security, and international participation in UN 
peacekeeping initiatives. 
C. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN MALAWI 
Military intervention facilitated the smooth process of democratization of Malawi, 
which eventually allowed the country to interact with the international community and 
fully participate in the fight against terrorism, promotion of regional peace and 
international order.175 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks  on America, the United 
Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 1373 calling for states to work together 
immediately to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including increased cooperation and 
full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism.176 
UNSCR 1373 emphasizes the need to suppress terrorism financing and criminalization of 
such related acts.177 Despite lack of legislative and regulatory frameworks to implement 
UNSCR 1373, Malawi has criminalized terrorism financing and ratified the United 
Nations Conventions on suppression, finance and support of terrorism.178 
Malawi has shown a lot of commitment toward the global fight against terrorism 
despite a lack of well-established institutions and inadequate resources. This was 
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evidenced when Malawi set up a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2001. 
The Office of the President and Cabinet Minister chairs the NCTC committee, and the 
other members come from the Ministries of Defense, Home Affairs and Internal Security, 
Information and Civic Education, Transport, Finance, Justice and Foreign Affairs. The 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Reserve Bank of Malawi also form part of the 
NCTC committee. The committee meets on a quarterly basis and now its main task is to 
review legislation that is related to terrorism and commensurate with UN Resolutions 
with a view to incorporating anti-terrorism framework within the laws of Malawi.179  
Effective anti-money laundering laws promote financial institutions in tracking down 
people involved in illegal and criminal activities. Criminals need to engage in financial 
dealings with financial and commercial institutions for their survival and conduct of 
operations. This creates opportunities for law enforcement authorities to detect crime as the 
criminals interact with the commercial and financial sectors. In the course of such interaction, 
the criminals leave paper traces that can be used for tracking and investigations and, 
consequently, initiate apprehension. Through aggressive pursuit, money launderers and 
terrorist groups can be captured and frustrated, thereby preventing them from funding further 
terrorist activities.180 As part of institutional democratic consolidation and an effort to 
combat terrorism, Malawi formed a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that is the prime 
mover in the implementation of the anti-money laundering and combating terrorism 
financing (CTF) act of 2006.181 The FIU is fully funded by the government and the unit is 
interconnected to all commercial, financial and law enforcement institutions in order to 
deal with all matters regarding money laundering and terrorism financing in Malawi. 
With technical assistance from the US government and the Millennium Challenge 
Cooperation (MCC), the FIU has acquired technical equipment.182 Some of the 
equipment includes computers, servers, scanners, printers, and software to mention just a 
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few. The FIU developed a web site and a local area network with its headquarters based 
in Lilongwe, the capital city of the Malawi. The FIU is also responsible to the NCTC.183 
In June 2003, the government of Malawi deported five foreign men accused of 
connections with A-Qaeda operatives. The suspects were identified following a tip from 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America.184 Islam is the 
second largest religion after Christianity in Malawi,185 and Muslims protested against the 
deportation since they were benefitting from the services of the alleged Al Qaeda 
affiliates. The Muslim protestants in the central district of Kasungu were dispersed by the 
Malawi Police using non-lethal rubber bullets and tear gas. In Mangochi, a Muslim 
stronghold district in the south region of the country, demonstrators looted seven 
Christian Churches and the U.S. offices of Save the Children.186 A group of about 50 
Muslims gathered at the Mangochi Police Station where the detainees were being held 
before being deported. The police repelled and dispersed them with the help of security 
reinforcement assurance by Malawi Defense Force Marine Unit located some 60km north 
within the same district.  Of the five men, two were in-charge of local charities, wand the 
third was a tutor at a Muslim school.  Muluzi, who was the first multiparty president, was 
a Muslim, himself, and persuaded his fellow Muslims by declaring that religious 
intolerance would not be allowed.187 This shows that the president was really committed 
to democratic norms and the global fight against terrorism. 
Additionally, it can be argued that the complete disarmament and disbanding of 
the MYP eliminated probable threats that the group would degenerate into an insurgency 
and probably mutate into terrorist organization, consequently providing safe havens for 
other possible terrorists such as the ones that were deported in June 2003. Malawi has 
fertile ground for terrorist activities because of its porous borders, weak institutions that 
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promote corruption, cultivation and availability of Indian hemp and other drugs, and 
different types of locally available fertilizers—due to a current government subsidy 
program to enhance food security in the country.188 These fertilizers can easily be used to 
make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations can be made: 
 To avoid the abuse of forces and power, it is recommended that African 
countries should have only one armed organization to uphold the integrity 
and sovereignty of independent states. 
 The established institutions should be made fully operational through 
proper legislation and funding in order to security interest. 
 Civil authorities achieve meaningful civilian control of the military.189 The 
military should also have clear channels of communication where the 
enlisted personnel can directly communicate with the generals to resolve 
military crucial issues of national  
 Malawi should provide adequate fiscal support for the implementation of 
projects that have a bearing on morale and welfare of military personnel in 
general. Other institutions established to provide oversight and civilian 
control include the Defense Council (DC) and the Defense Security 
Committee of the National Assembly (DSCNA), which has proportionate 
representation of all political parties having seats in the National 
Assembly. 
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 Malawi should train and develop expertise in civilian personnel to be able 
to provide the expected civilian control of intelligence. Government 
civilian officials need to learn about intelligence so that they can be able to 
control it. 
 Malawi should ensure that it has the expertise and equipment through 
appropriate training in capacity and institutional building in dealing with 
counterterrorism issues. 
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